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Abstract: In this paper we draw attention to the important role technology plays 
in co-mediating institutions, opening up some courses of action and closing off 
others. Irrigation studies generally recognize the importance of institutions in 
making technologies work, but tend to take the precise functioning of institutions 
for granted. Studies that analyse institutions often do not pay enough attention 
to the mediating role of technology in allocating benefits, risks and burdens. We 
show in this paper that (irrigation) institutions are moulded by and come about 
through the interactions between the technical and the social in dynamic and 
often contested processes of adaptation to changing environments. We argue that 
a critical understanding of what institutions do requires more explicit and detailed 
attention to technologies. We base this argument on a detailed historical analysis 
of the functioning of Seguia Khrichfa, a farmer managed irrigation scheme 
in Morocco. Through time, irrigation institutions in the Seguia Khrichfa have 
undergone transformations to match the changing demands of a heterogeneous and 
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growing group of irrigators, an increased command area and changing cropping 
patterns, and the introduction of new technologies such as drip irrigation. These 
institutional transformations consisted of recursive cycles of modifications in 
technological infrastructure and the rules of allocation and distribution. Technical 
adaptations prompt alterations in the water rotation schedule and vice versa. We 
anchor our case in descriptions of a specific technology that played a crucial role 
in co-steering institutional change: the introduction of open/closed gates. Our 
analysis of the co-evolution of society and technology in shaping institutions 
in the Seguia Khrichfa shows how technologies become enrolled in (sometimes 
implicit) processes of re-negotiating relations of authority and responsibility 
while obscuring institutional politics.
Keywords: Critical institutionalism; drip irrigation; FMIS; Morocco; socio-
technical approach
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1. Introduction
The first impression one gets when visiting the Seguia Khrichfa irrigation system 
in Northwest Morocco is that it is a place of tranquillity, tradition and harmony. 
One sees a well-maintained canal, filled with clear irrigation water (potable, as the 
water users will proudly add) from the Bittit springs. One may run into one of the 
canal operators on his bicycle, chatting with farmers waiting for their irrigation 
turn. When the visit takes place just after the harvest of wheat in June, one sees 
sheep and goats grazing the wheat stubbles in the fields. It is also the time when 
some farmers will plant tobacco, standing with their feet in the wetted fields. On 
adjacent fields, bright green onion plants will be growing and further away one 
will see fruit trees full with almost-ripe fruits. The Seguia Khrichfa winds through 
this restful landscape. It has irrigated the fields already for a hundred years or 
more, as the president of the water users’ organisation will explain. The only thing 
that seems not to fit the rural idyll are the black, plastic drip irrigation pipelines 
on several fields. Drip irrigation is generally associated with private groundwater 
wells and high-value crops, rather than with collective surface water systems 
and family farming. These modern irrigation artefacts therefore appear to belong 
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to a different and more modern agricultural era, one centred on profit-making 
individuals competing with each other rather than on collaborating farmers who 
enter into mutual agreements to share available resources among themselves. Yet, 
both farmers and engineers referred to the introduction of drip irrigation as yet 
another manifestation of the modernity and success of the Seguia Khrichfa.
This paradox forms the starting point of this paper. We use the technology as 
an entry point to trace and analyse the functioning of institutions for sharing and 
managing water. We show that the Seguia Khrichfa is not as stable and harmonious 
as it may seem at first sight. Rather than a radical break with unchanging traditions, 
the contemporary changes in Seguia Khrichfa around the introduction of drip 
irrigation form part of a long historical sequence of sociotechnical modifications. 
These new technologies were mixed and blended in flexible and seemingly 
easy ways with old canals and water sharing practices in response to changing 
conditions. Indeed, the durability and success of Khrichfa appears to lie in its 
ability to continuously adapt to changing circumstances: variable annual rainfall 
patterns; varying spring discharges; new crops with new water demands; new 
irrigators; new technologies.
One important objective of these adaptations precisely is to maintain (an 
appearance of) harmony and social order and the avoidance of open struggles. 
Water users in Khrichfa are a heterogeneous group, comprised of farmers of 
different ethnic origin, settlement histories and land-tenure status (landowners 
and sharecroppers). These, combined with differences in the location of one’s 
plots along the canal (head-end or tail-end) and the fact that there is not enough 
water in the canal to irrigate all land – with only a quarter of the land that can be 
irrigated with the available canal water – creates a potentially fertile ground for 
competition and conflict over water. Yet, although each modification in the water 
distribution entails (sometimes subtle) shifts in relations of power and authority 
between involved actors, irrigators in Khrichfa rarely directly confront each other 
in explicit disputes (Abdellaoui 2009). Instead, and as our study shows, in the 
Seguia Khrichfa irrigation system, conflicts and struggles are dealt with through 
frequent interactions, often by encapsulating or absorbing them in continuous 
social and technical negotiations and adaptations to the system. 
We use our analysis for a reflection and discussion on how to understand 
institutions. We make two points. First, our analysis suggests that institutional 
rules are not just social, but are also expressed in technologies and infrastructures. 
Tracing the many changes that the irrigation system went through in the last 
decades illustrates how institutional changes happened through mutually 
dependent modifications in technologies and rules. Neither the technical nor the 
social are fixed, but co-shape each other in recursive and often contested processes 
of socio-technical re-ordering. Second, following on from the early observations 
of Geertz (1972) based on his comparison of irrigation institutions in Bali and 
Morocco, we put forward the suggestion that what institutions are and what they 
do is intimately linked to the types of distributional dilemmas they have to deal 
with.
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In the next section, we discuss possible ways to understand the relation between 
resources, social organization and technologies, and propose ways to link these to 
critical institutionalism. We proceed with a detailed description of a number of key 
socio-technical changes in Seguia Khrichfa which illustrate that the institutional 
efforts to maintain cohesion were simultaneously social and material, with new or 
adjusted technologies prompting new allocation practices which in turn required 
new forms of discursive legitimacy. We finish with further reflections on how 
to understand the material of the social in critical institutional analyses: how to 
capture the role of (changing) technologies in justifying, modifying or ‘fixing’ 
relations of authority and responsibility in natural resources management?
1.1. Theorizing institutions as sociotechnical systems
Irrigation institutions form, and are formed by relations between different actors. 
They form an important part of the bundle of arrangements through which the 
distribution of water is regulated, defining not just whom is entitled to how much 
water when, but also stipulating who can make these decisions and on what 
basis (Zwarteveen et al. 2005; Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014). These institutions 
comprise formal rules, organisation and authorities but also consist of implicit, 
less clearly defined norms and rules (Cleaver 2012). Because they deal with 
distributional questions, which are inherently contested, irrigation institutions 
are intrinsically political and often reflect and shape social relations of power 
between users (Leach et al. 2010; Cleaver 2012). Explicitly acknowledging the 
political and contested nature of institutional arrangements draws analytical 
attention to how institutional frameworks and relations need to be constantly re-
confirmed and re-negotiated. Such negotiations can be openly confrontational, 
but can also consist of more subtle processes consisting of different strategies 
that are partly bounded by technological and institutional path-dependencies or 
cultural preferences.
Recognition of the important role of technology in mediating and co-
constituting distributional choices in water management is not new. Starting in the 
1980s, social studies of irrigation highlighted how social arrangements interact 
with the physical infrastructure to create particular distributional outcomes. 
Social scientists drew attention to the importance of ‘the social’ for explaining 
what technologies do as part of attempts to change a hitherto predominantly 
technical irrigation profession. Central to this body of work was an understanding 
of “irrigation management as a socio-technical process consisting of a technical 
infrastructure and an institutional framework which determines the use of that 
infrastructure” (Uphoff 1986), an understanding which was developed and tested 
through meticulous studies of farmer managed irrigation systems (Coward 1980; 
Martin and Yoder 1986; Pradhan 1989; Ostrom 1992). Likewise, in Morocco, 
Pascon (1984) insisted on the need for “soft technology” when intervening in the 
hydraulic infrastructure of farmer managed irrigation systems, in order to have 
the “least injuries in the social fabric” of the communities concerned. Many social 
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scientists thus ‘talked to’ engineers, to make them aware of the social and political 
choices that their designs embodied. Here instead, we want to use insights from 
the institutional contents of technology to draw attention to the ‘material of the 
social’: how are institutions simultaneously social and technical, and how can 
recognition of the ‘also-technical’ character of institutions contribute to critical 
institutionalism (Cleaver 2012)?
Two schools of thought have provided important sources of inspiration 
to grasp the simultaneously social and technical character of irrigation and 
water management (Mollinga 1998; Bolding 2004): the Social Construction of 
Technology school (SCOT) (Winner 1986; Bijker and Law 1992) and actor-
network approaches (ANT) (Latour 1987; Law 1992). The basic premise of 
both theoretical approaches is that technologies do not only mediate people’s 
relationships with bio-physical processes, but also shape the social (people-
people) relationships that co-structure how resources are controlled. Rather than 
looking for intrinsic characteristics of either the technology or the institutions, 
scholars working in these traditions direct the attention to the interactions between 
people and technologies (Bolding et al. 2000) to explain the durability of systems 
and the actual water flows and distributions that they produce. More generally 
for water, a recent stream of mainly geographical scholarship echoes notions of 
socio-technicality to express that the boundaries between nature, technology and 
society are never pre-given, but themselves the effect of the hard construction 
work of the actors involved, and of particular political histories of struggles over 
water (Swyngedouw 1999; Bakker 2010; Mollinga 2014). Particularly influential 
are Actor-Network approaches, which treat all elements in a socio-technical 
network as relational. These are subject to re-ordering and thus ‘potential sites of 
struggle’ (Law 1992, 386). In explaining how heterogeneous networks of human 
and material elements become patterned, these approaches do not a-priori reserve 
a shaping role to humans (Law 1992).
2. Methods
One important implication of socio technical approaches for understanding 
institutions is that the rules and the organization of rules existing at a particular 
point in time cannot be taken for granted: they exist through the various networks 
of which they form part, and require continuous work to re-assert boundaries, 
relations and rules. Acknowledging this dynamic aspect of socio-technical 
networks implies that institutions cannot be approached from a single point in time. 
Instead, the focus shifts to how connections and patterns (re-)order the everyday 
practices of actors in never-ending processes. Material substances – technologies 
and infrastructural lay-outs – partly reflect and co-shape (the outcomes of) these 
processes. Another interesting insight of Actor-Network approaches is that the 
work that has gone into making a technology tends to disappear once it is working 
– a process called ‘black-boxing’: all that remains is a ‘matter-of-fact’ artefact 
(Law 2009; Heeks 2013). This also means that ‘unpacking’ the technology 
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(tracing the networks that made it possible and that constitute it) is an important 
methodological strategy for understanding and making visible the distributional 
choices that it helps producing (Veldwisch et al. 2009; Heeks 2013).
We primarily based our investigations on around one hundred semi-structured 
interviews with water users and managers; repeated observations of water user – 
canal interactions; and participations in and observations of irrigation management 
activities during more than one year of intensive fieldwork (2012–2013). A typical 
semi-structured interview for this research included close observations of, and 
discussions about, the technology together with the informant. Asking questions 
about the material traces of other times, for instance, proved a fruitful strategy for 
invoking vivid memories of the social organization of the past.
3. The Seguia Khrichfa irrigation system
3.1. Background
The Seguia Khrichfa is a secondary canal of the Ain Bittit irrigation system, 
located in the Saiss region (Northwest Morocco). Ain Bititt can be characterised 
as a farmer managed irrigation system, but it has benefitted from frequent state 
interventions. The Bittit springs (Ain meaning spring in Arab) provide water to 
five secondary canals, amongst which is the Seguia Khrichfa (Figure 1). The 
Seguia Khrichfa brings water to three small villages (douars): Ait Moussi, Ait 
Amar and Ait Brahim.
Dealing with change is a major characteristic of the Seguia Khrichfa. The 
water users are used to variable rainfall patterns (both within the year and over the 
years), which require adaptations in irrigation applications. Besides climatologic 
uncertainties, there are many other changes and dynamics that require the Seguia 
Khrichfa to continuously adapt. The available water in the canal, for instance, 
fluctuates as it is a proportion of the variable discharge of the springs. Water 
availability in the canal also depends on how much spring water is used by others. 
Also, the number of parcels to be irrigated differ each year, requiring creative 
ways of sharing the available water. In 2013, the total area of Khrichfa that could 
potentially be irrigated covered 400 hectares. Yet, the canal discharge of ca.100 
l/s only allowed irrigating a quarter of this area. Another major institutional 
challenge in the Seguia Khrichfa is to accommodate a growing group of water 
users of changing composition. The number of water users is growing because 
water users sub-divide water and land among large numbers of heirs and because 
new people settle in the area. These new people clear land adjacent to the existing 
command area and hope to be granted access to the water of the canal, thus 
creating additional demands to an already limited availability of water. The group 
of irrigators is very heterogeneous in terms of ethnic origins and land tenure 
status. In addition, crop-preferences continuously change and the water service 
thus has to accommodate changing cropping patterns. A last important source 
of change stems from the historically strong relations that exist between the 
irrigation system and the Moroccan state, resulting in state-sponsored technical 
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interventions that transform the irrigation system, including its technologies, its 
water distribution and the organisation of water users. 
The capacity to continuously adapt to all these changes is perhaps the most 
important characteristic of the irrigation institutions in Khrichfa. The often-heard 
answer of Khrichfa water users when asked for the reasons of a particular change, 
is telling in this regard: “il faut bouger,” one needs to keep moving. It is clear that 
changes also redistribute water and power, and that different people strategically 
manipulate to steer such re-distributions in their favour. Yet, what is remarkable 
is the near-absence of conflicts or struggles, of open confrontations and clashes. 
There are many tensions in Khrichfa, for instance about the competition over water 
(rights) with other water users such as a downstream irrigation community and the 
drinking water provider of Meknes (who makes use of the same springs), or about 
the distribution of water between sharecroppers and landowners, who depend on 
each other for their existence in agriculture. These tensions, however, seldom erupt 
in the form of open confrontations or struggles. Geertz characterised co-operation 
around water in the Moroccan irrigation systems he studied as happening in 
Figure 1: Bittit irrigation system, including the Seguia Khrichfa (secondary canal).
8 Saskia van der Kooij et al.
an “agonistic sort of way” (Geertz 1972, 32): he noted that institutional efforts 
are geared towards avoiding that the inevitable competition over water leads to 
exclusions, struggles or open conflicts. Actively maintaining an appearance of 
a well-functioning FMIS is also very strategic in view of increasing chances of 
obtaining public projects and support to the area.
3.2. Water rights
The history of Seguia Khrichfa is marked by the establishment of water 
rights to the Bittitt springs, from which it draws its waters. The government 
administration proportionally divided the rights to the Bittit springs between the 
city of Meknes (for drinking water) and two ethnic tribes, Ait Ouallal and Ait 
Ayach during the French Protectorate (Abdellaoui 2009). The Seguia Khrichfa 
is a secondary canal that serves part of the Ait Ouallal tribe. Water tenure is 
governed by a combination of collective and individual rights: at the system 
and canal levels, the management of the irrigation water is a collective affair 
of the community. Underneath this collective management, water is also the 
object of what resembles private ‘ownership.’ Geertz expressed this ownership 
as “something which one can possess only as an agency, not as an object, but 
no less firmly for that” (Geertz 1972, 32). All that an individual possesses is not 
substance, but rather a relationship (in time) with other users (Hammoudi 1982) 
where water rights are “confined and limited in a complex system of social 
relationships” (Mahdi 1986, 182). Ownership in the Khrichfa canal refers to the 
right to use a certain proportion of the available flow in the canal for a certain 
time. In operational terms, ‘ownership’ is the number of hours someone is 
entitled to irrigate per ‘turn.’ As the amount of water is not sufficient to irrigate 
all plots simultaneously, the total water flow is divided in sequential time-slots 
(‘turns’), a rotation schedule that determines which plots are to be irrigated 
when. Each ‘owner’ thus gets a number of irrigation turns, and the number 
of hours determines when and how long he1
 can irrigate per turn. The period 
between two turns depends on the total number of irrigation hours that the water 
users collectively own.
In the Seguia Khrichfa, water and land ‘are not married’ as the expression 
goes; one can inherit, buy, hire, exchange or borrow water from an owner, 
independent from land ownership. Most water users of Khrichfa own, or work 
on, several plots located in different places along the canal. They themselves can 
choose where to use their irrigation hours in the most strategic way. They often 
do not ‘own’ enough water to irrigate all their plots, as the total irrigable area 
of the Khrichfa irrigation system is greater than the discharge that the canal can 
1
 Throughout the paper, we use masculine terms to refer to farmers or irrigators. This reflects the fact 
that most people we encountered in the field and in the WUA board, and most of our interviewees, 
were men. Yet, farming and irrigation crucially depend on the productive and reproductive work of 
women, and the social domains in which water arrangements happen importantly include the private 
and family domains associated with women (also see Bossenbroek and Zwarteveen 2015). 
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cover. The fact that water ‘ownership’ is unrelated to land ownership also implies 
that it is possible that someone owns water without land. The irrigation schedule 
is updated and agreed upon at the start of every season, based on the water right 
transactions of the past season and the location of the plots that right holders wish 
to irrigate. 
The members of the secondary canals of Bittit are organised in Water Users 
Associations (WUA), which are managed by a board of six elected members and 
one board member appointed by the State. Created in 1996 in parallel to existing 
and less formal irrigation institutions (jmaa), the Khrichfa WUA only became 
really active in 2004 in response to the increased tensions about water distribution. 
Before that, water right holders would only come together once a year before 
the start of the irrigation season to discuss the annual irrigation schedule, and 
entrust water distribution to canal operators (waqqaf). Much responsibility and 
power for everyday water management thus lay with these canal operators as they 
implemented the water distribution, creatively operating multiple arrangements to 
deal with change (see Hammoudi 1982).
3.3. Land tenure
During the French Protectorate, the Ait Ouallal pastoralists living in the area 
received more water than they needed to irrigate their food crops (such as 
cereals and maize for own consumption). The relative abundance of water 
attracted settlers from other regions. Most of them entered into sharecropping 
arrangements with the Ait Ouallal landowners to engage in tobacco production. 
While the sharecroppers worked the land, the Ait Ouallal landowners identified 
themselves as pastoralists. Gradually, lands that were situated outside of 
the original irrigated area were also taken into production by the increasing 
number of sharecroppers, thus increasing the competition over water. Prevailing 
sharecropping arrangements stipulated that the landowner provided water and 
land, while the sharecropper contributed labour. The ‘ownership’ of water thus 
stayed with the Ait Ouallal landowners. The owner of water paid the canal 
operator, which gave the water ‘owner’ the right to influence the canal operator 
and discuss and decide about how the water distribution executed by the canal 
operator should happen.
Sharecroppers had none of these rights, even though they were the actual 
irrigators and thus had to activate the water rights of the landowner to make use of 
it. Especially in the village Ait Amar, sharecropping activities appeared successful 
with plenty opportunity for agricultural extension. The inhabitants of Ait Moussi, 
located in the head-end of Khrichfa and close to the communal grazing lands, 
continued with pastoral activities parallel to farming. In Ait Brahim, the tail-end 
village, land tenure was importantly shaped by the colonial farms, where the farm 
owners worked with labourers rather than sharecroppers. Nowadays, Ait Amar is 
the largest village along the Khrichfa canal, and has the largest number of right 
holders to Khrichfa water (219 from the total 309 right holders). 
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Sharecropping can be financially risky for a landowner, and some landowners 
failed in making enough profits, which obliged them to sell their livestock. While 
recalling this, Hmidou, a sharecropper in Ait Amar, explained (19-07-2012) with 
pride the humiliation of an Ait Ouallal landowner who came to his father (the 
sharecropper) as he needed a sheep to celebrate a marriage. The landowner asked 
his sharecropper to provide him with a sheep in exchange for a small parcel of 
land – thus reversing the relation between the two. Other landowners obtained 
high profits from sharecropping arrangements, which gave them the possibility 
to send their children to schools and universities in nearby cities. Many of the 
second generation educated landowners moved to cities, where they often obtained 
government positions, which they used to channel support and resources back 
to their native communities. The Ait Ouallal community thus benefitted from 
many projects, including the introduction or improvement of electricity, schools, 
infrastructure and irrigation. Sharecroppers attempted to re-negotiate their relation 
with the absentee landowners by buying small parcels of often marginal land to 
construct their own houses or produce their own crops. Some also bought water in 
small quantities (e.g. 15 min) to obtain the right to participate in decision-making 
on canal management and to control the actual water distribution of the canal 
operator.
The Seguia Khrichfa thus serves a diverse and heterogeneous group of water 
users. Although tensions exist between the different groups, they do need each 
other for continuing their agricultural activities or to maintain and materialize 
their water rights. Here, we show how the dynamic relations between absentee 
landowners, landless sharecroppers and the three different villages were 
importantly co-shaped by technological transformations in the Seguia Khrichfa. 
We do this by telling the story of one specific technology: offtakes with open/closed 
gates. We first describe the process that led to the choice for these proportional 
gates, and analyse what this choice entailed in terms of institutional modalities for 
distributing, accessing and controlling water.
4. Offtakes with open/closed gates: control over proportional 
water distribution
4.1. Rehabilitation of the Ain Bittit irrigation infrastructure
In the early 1970s, the agricultural ministry selected Ain Bittit for a World 
Bank financed rehabilitation project (Bazzi 1987). It may have been chosen for 
technical support because it was already known by the agricultural ministry as it 
shared the spring water with the drinking water provider of Meknes, and because 
several Ait Ouallal landowners worked for the State. The project, implemented 
in 1983, consisted of the lining of the earthen secondary canals of the irrigation 
system. The engineer who designed the lined canals based his calculations on 
the 1949 water allocation as registered during the French Protectorate: each 
secondary canal was entitled to a certain proportion of the total spring discharge, 
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expressed in shares.2 The size of one share was based on an engineering rule of 
thumb, the ‘main d’eau’: the flow of water that one farmer can handle, 20–30 
l/s. The number of shares per secondary canal depended on the total number 
of ‘owners’ along the canal. The Seguia Khrichfa received three shares, in 
theory enabling three farmers to irrigate at the same time. However, due to ever-
increasing numbers of water users, who gradually extended the canal’s command 
area, there was more and more pressure on the available water. As a consequence, 
the duration of the interval between two water turns increased to sometimes more 
than 14 days. This led to disputes among farmers about the appropriate interval 
between two turns, disputes that originated in a lack of clarity about the number 
of people that were entitled to a share of the Seguia Khrichfa water. For example, 
had the appropriators of the previously French farms in Ait Brahim also obtained 
the water rights of the French land owner, or should these water rights instead 
be returned to the villagers of Ait Brahim, from whom the French had taken the 
rights in the first place?.
4.2. Off-takes with circular orifices: calculated but un-transparent water 
distribution
The offtakes that the engineer designed as part of the rehabilitation project were 
gate-controlled circular orifices. These orifices consist of circular openings in the 
canal wall that can be opened or closed. The discharge that flows through the 
orifice is related to the difference in water height upstream and downstream of 
the opening (Figure 2). According to the engineer’s calculations, if three farmers 
would open these orifices at the same time at their respective offtakes, they would 
each receive 20–30 l/s (the precise amount depending on the actual discharge of 
the springs), equivalent to the calculated ‘main d’eau.’ If more farmers would 
open their gates simultaneously (which was not the intention of the engineer), the 
water height in the canal would reduce, thereby lowering the off-taking discharge 
flowing through each orifice (Figure 3).
These new gated orifices had important implications for how disputes over the 
sharing of water played out. As the orifices were located in the canal wall below 
the water line, they were invisible, making it possible for irrigators to tinker with 
their gates without being easily found out by others. In principle, only the canal 
operator had the power to control the use of the orifices, as he was in charge 
to guide the water from one water user to another and to distribute it in three 
equal shares. However, it was impossible for him to simultaneously control all 
the orifices along the whole length (7 km) of the canal. Some water users made 
use of the invisibility of the offtakes by secretly enlarging their orifice to create 
2
 The Arabic word used to express a share of water is fez, which means hoe. This refers to the 
discharge that one farmer can guide through the fields with a hoe when he irrigates. In Bittit, farmers 
use this word to express a certain proportional share of the total available water. For the sake of 
readability and ease of understanding, here we will use the word share.
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Figure 2: Side view of an orifice. The discharge passing through the orifice is a function of the 
height of the water above the downstream water height (h).
a higher discharge. At some places, farmers created their own, new offtakes by 
making openings in the canal wall. Over time, some orifices could not be properly 
closed anymore, resulting in water continuously flowing through these openings 
when there was water in the canal. Together, all the ‘leakages,’ informal offtakes 
and increased discharges in offtakes in the upstream part resulted in a severely 
reduced availability of water for the downstream water users, located at the end of 
the canal. Some farmers remedied this by blocking the canal downstream of their 
offtake, increasing the water height at the offtake and thus the amount of water 
received. All this tinkering with the offtakes also led to a gradual deterioration 
of the infrastructure. An MSc thesis in 1987 thus concludes: “The hydro-
Figure 3: When an additional orifice is opened, the water height will lower (dotted lines), thus 
resulting in a lower discharge through each orifice.
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agricultural infrastructure of the Bittit irrigation system, constructed in 1983, is in 
a deteriorated state. The lined canals are broken, the off-takes are destroyed and 
the gates are lost.” (Bazzi 1987).
In sum, the orifices that were designed to allow three simultaneously 
irrigating water users to receive a similar discharge, literally reduced the 
transparency of water distribution in the Seguia Khrichfa. This made it relatively 
easy for upstream users to take more water than their entitlement. As the current 
president of the WUA concludes when recounting this episode of the Khrichfa 
history:
“The holes (referring to the orifices), it isn’t logical, it is not logical when 
working with shares. Maybe some-one takes more than his right.” (9-10-2013)
4.3. Open/closed gates: making the proportionality visible again
In 1992, the Regional Directorate of Hydraulics proposed a solution to the water 
distribution problems in the canal, by suggesting the installation of three open/
closed gates after each offtake, and removing all the orifices. From now on, these 
simple offtakes had gates that were either completely open or completely closed, 
hence the name: ‘Tout Ou Rien’ (T.O.R.), ‘all or nothing’ gates. All intakes – a total 
of fifty intakes in the main canal and in the major secondary canals – were replaced 
by new division boxes with four T.O.R. gates each. In contrast to the hidden 
orifices, the T.O.R. gates made the proportional division of water in three shares 
(again) clearly visible to users, with the water flow visibly divided in three equal 
shares. The system was relatively straightforward and easy to operate (Figure 4).
The T.O.R. gates made the water distribution transparent and less sensitive 
to tampering. At any point in time, visual inspection of how water is divided was 
possible. This allowed irrigators to hold each other accountable for when and 
how much they irrigated. Although the canal operator was still needed to indicate 
when a water users’ turn would start and end, the T.O.R. gates prompted farmers 
to monitor water distribution themselves. Irrigators, especially from the tail-end 
villages, often irrigated with two family members: while one was irrigating, the 
other would monitor the canal to make sure no other farmer was taking water out 
of turn. The technology thus prompted a decentralization of the control over water 
distribution (from just the canal operator to all water users), by allowing irrigators 
to themselves check if water division happened according to the agreed rotation 
schedule.
The increased transparency of water division also made it possible to make 
changes to the rotation schedule: it was no longer necessary for farmers with 
neighbouring fields to irrigate simultaneously (which was the case at the time of 
the circular orifices, with the canal operator having to keep an eye on the open 
offtakes), but turns could be distributed to any potential field along the canal. In 
1996, some farmers started to make creative use of this possibility, as they wanted 
to shift from tobacco cultivation to onion production.
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4.4. Exchanging water turns
In the beginning of the 1990s, onion cultivation became a profitable activity in the 
Saiss as market prices for onions were high. Farmers along the Khrichfa canal, 
however, were frustrated in their desire to grow onions by the rotational schedule 
of the irrigation system: the water turn of 14 days was too long for onions, which 
need to be irrigated every 3–4 days. The creative solution of a few youngsters 
was to exchange irrigation hours amongst themselves. To irrigate with shorter 
intervals, they irrigated one week with half of their own water turn while someone 
else irrigated further downstream with the other half of their water turn. The next 
week, they could then irrigate with half of the water turn of the other water user 
who would have his turn by then, while using the remaining half of the water 
themselves (Figure 5). Hucine, who often travelled to regions where he saw onion 
cultivation, claims that he and his sharecropper first started this idea: 
“I proposed to the sharecropper on my land: isn’t it possible to divide the 
number of hours by two, and use one part this week and the other part next 
week?” (26-09-2013)
Figure 4: Use of the T.O.R. gates to obtain a proportional water division (starting in the upper-
left corner, clockwise): 1) offtake of a water user who does not irrigate; 2) offtake of the most 
upstream irrigating water user; 3) offtake of the second irrigating water user; 4) offtake of the 
most downstream irrigating water user.
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Others noticed their success, until 
“Little by little, farmers did the same thing, till the idea reigned in the region” 
(26-09-2013) 
Exchanging water was made possible because of the T.O.R. gates, as these 
enabled splitting the water turns amongst plots that are located far away from 
each other. From 1996 till 2004, more and more farmers started cultivating onions 
and exchanging water. However, for water users with a short water turn (many 
of whom were sharecroppers) – for example half an hour – it was not possible 
to engage in these water exchanges, as it would make their already short turns 
too short to manage. Also farmers in the tail-end village Ait Brahim, where the 
discharge in the canal was considerably lower and who had less contact with other 
users along the Khrichfa canal, did not join the exchange system. Thus, T.O.R. 
gates enabled some water users to participate in the beneficial exchange of water 
turns, but not others.
4.5. A water rotation of seven days for all
The unequal possibilities for exchanging water turns were not the only source of 
tension along the canal. Also other inequalities caused frictions, e.g. between head-
end and tail-end or between landowners and sharecroppers. These frictions led 
to disputes, and complaints to the local and provincial authorities. These finally 
Figure 5: The exchanges of water at the Khrichfa canal: water user 1 irrigates with half of his 
irrigation hours, then gives the remaining water to water user 8. After irrigating, water user 8 
gives the water turn to the downstream neighbour of water user 1, thus water user 2.
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prompted an institutional adaptation, consisting of the revival of the WUA in 
2004. The WUA had officially been created in 1996 by the State, but it had never 
been an important body for decision making as water users continued to rely on 
existing forms of organization with the canal operator for water distribution. The 
revival of the WUA happened with the help of the caid, the local authority. In 
order to ease the tensions in the community, the caid enforced a voting system for 
all water users (and not just for water right holders) during the general assembly. 
The water users strategically proposed board members and lobbied for votes so 
that all interest groups would be represented. This resulted in the appointment of 
a retired technician from the agricultural extension service (originating from the 
group of Ait Ouallal landowners) as president of the WUA; the appointment of two 
sharecroppers (one of them had been canal operator, the other was part of the largest 
sharecropping family) and a newly installed investor with political connections as 
the other members of the board. The water users had high expectations that this 
new board would help solve the existing problems and tensions. Especially the 
new president was mentioned by many water users as a key person in the new 
board. He represented different user groups, as he was born in Ait Amar, while his 
mother originated from Ait Brahim. During his work for the agricultural extension 
service he used to advise the Khrichfa water users about tobacco, onion and potato 
cultivation, and after retirement he still continued to provide advice to farmers. If 
offered the chance, he enjoys recalling the history of the irrigation system – to us 
as researchers but also to youngsters in the Khrichfa area.
One of the first changes the new board made was to reduce the water turn 
from fourteen days to seven days for all water users. In addition, instead of giving 
the water turn to three neighbouring farmers, the new board members decided 
to divide the irrigation system in three sectors, each irrigating with 1/3 of the 
total canal discharge (i.e. 20–30 l/s) with a rotational schedule per sector. The 
objective was to make onion farming possible for all and to reduce the disparity 
in discharge between head-end and tail-end. The board of the WUA also changed 
the relation between water users and the canal operator by using the official 
regulations for water users associations, which stipulate that water users pay the 
WUA, who in turn pays the canal operator. Before, the water users directly paid 
the canal operator. Through this change, the WUA increased its own power as 
an intermediate body with the financial means and authority on water allocation 
and distribution. The new board of the WUA also decided to employ three canal 
operators instead of one, so that each of them could distribute one share of the 
total discharge within one sector of the Seguia Khrichfa. This reduced the area of 
influence per canal operator.
5. New modalities of water access through creative integration 
of groundwater and T.O.R. gates
The changes of the intake structures co-evolved with changes that shifted the 
control over water shares and their distribution from the canal operator to the 
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WUA. The T.O.R. gates decentralized the control over water, and thus made 
the position of the canal operators weaker. The WUA board made use of these 
changing relations, and they justified their authority by referring to the national 
code for WUAs which stipulates that WUAs should assign, and pay for, canal 
operators. Material changes thus triggered changes within the socio-technical 
network, creating possibilities for some actors to draw new elements into the 
network and making their position stronger. 
Other technological modifications followed the T.O.R. gates. In 1997, 
a rehabilitation project installed a collective tube-well, which created new 
modalities of accessing water. This project was the result of the successful lobby 
of the president of the Ait Ouallal community with the government for a new 
irrigation rehabilitation project. The project consisted of the equipment of several 
existing boreholes (once drilled to measure the groundwater level) with pumps. 
These pumps added groundwater to the secondary canals, thus increasing the 
water availability. For the Seguia Khrichfa, this created the challenge to combine 
the existing rotational water supply with an on-demand water source. Through 
recursive material and regulatory changes, the WUA board made the tube-well 
fit with the existing seguia system: they increased the height of the canal walls, 
and proposed a different way of counting the number of shares. While in the 
past, they counted only three shares, corresponding to the three T.O.R. gates of 
the main canal, the fourth T.O.R. gate of the off-take was now counted as well. 
Thus, when all four gates were opened, the canal water would be divided in four 
shares. The basic idea of the T.O.R. gates remained the same: the water division 
was proportional and visible to all. This cosmetic increase in the number of shares 
allowed the tube-well water to be used with the existing technology and within the 
existing logic of the system. 
The tube-well created affordable, low-risk possibilities for accessing water, 
which was particularly beneficial for sharecroppers and irrigators in the tail end 
as they did not have, or only had few, water rights of their own. Yet, it also created 
its own, new set of questions: who should or should not be allowed to benefit from 
the tube-well and the Khrichfa canal waters? The WUA tried to set clear rules. 
First, it changed the demand procedure for renting out tube-well water: only right 
holders (who already owned a water turn) were allowed to make a request to rent 
in additional water. This, however, did not stop several sharecroppers who did not 
own water themselves to also use tube-well water: they just asked a befriended 
right holder to make a request on their behalf when they were in need of water. In 
2013, the WUA decided to make the tube-well share a part of the existing shares 
in the rotational schedule, thus making it impossible for non-right holders to get 
tube-well water.
The hiring out the tube-well water also implied that the WUA board became 
gradually involved in the sale of water, gaining legitimacy for making money 
from water deals. Through its water deals, the WUA board increased its income, 
thereby also strengthening its financial sustainability and asserting increased 
authority in the management of the irrigation system. Inspired by its new and 
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stronger position, the WUA board also started exploring other ways to financially 
benefit from the canal water. Drawing on efficiency arguments, the WUA board 
decided to split the canal water in five shares instead of four, which allowed them 
to reduce the period between water turns (which was beneficial for onion farming) 
and which allowed the WUA board to rent out additional water. This change was 
possible because the old division boxes with four T.O.R. gates had been replaced 
with division boxes with five T.O.R. gates. The division boxes divided the water 
in the right amount of shares and still allowed the irrigators to use the water 
anywhere along the canal and to visually verify the water distribution.
Not only did the introduction of the collective tube-well strengthen the position 
of the WUA, it also created new modalities of accessing water. This particularly 
suited certain water users: sharecroppers who longed for loosening their ties with 
landowners started renting small parcels, where they began cultivating onions 
with tube-well water. As the cropping season of onions is short, they only asked a 
few hours from the tube-well to satisfy their needs. This was much cheaper than 
buying or hiring surface water rights. In this way, the collective tube-well changed 
relations between some sharecroppers and landowners.
6. Drip irrigation sets the irrigation system once again in motion
The new modalities of water access (both tube-well water and the additional water 
from the WUA) significantly increased the water security of some sharecroppers. 
In 2004 one of them – Hmidou – decided to install drip irrigation on his field. 
Previously, he could not irrigate this field as it was located above the canal. 
However, thanks to the pressurized drip irrigation system, and a small basin to 
store canal water, the water could reach Hmidou’s plot, allowing him to make it 
suitable for onion cultivation. Others followed Hmidou’s example, and in 2013 
four individual farmers and a family cooperative of 30 members thus used drip 
irrigation systems using canal water. This in turn triggered the WUA to think about 
the introduction of drip irrigation on a collective basis: another technological 
change that would go accompanied with changes in the social organization of the 
irrigation system.
The new drip irrigation projects start to set in motion changes in the irrigation 
system. Rain-fed land uphill is now becoming more and more attractive as 
it can be irrigated with pressurized drip irrigation systems, while it is cheaper 
than irrigated land. These lands are also still fertile as compared to the exhausted 
plots in the irrigation system. In addition, these plots have not been subject to 
consecutive divisions because of inheritance and are thus larger than the plots 
within the irrigation system. This shifting valuation of hitherto rain-fed lands 
also creates shifts in social hierarchies: suddenly the owners of ‘unproductive 
land’ have ‘land with potential.’ Sharecroppers who had started to buy cheap, 
‘unproductive’ land from the 1990 onwards, now suddenly find themselves in 
a new, advantageous position. The introduction of drip irrigation projects in 
Khrichfa goes accompanied with yet another round of changes in water allocation: 
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drip irrigation needs a higher irrigation frequency and it can potentially ‘save’ 
water. To obtain this higher frequency, the drip irrigation owners have constructed 
basins to store water for some days. In addition, they use a similar trick as they 
did 15 years ago to create an irrigation frequency that fitted onion farming: they 
exchange water turns. 
Drip irrigation is known – and promoted as – an efficient irrigation 
technology: it allows irrigators to irrigate the same plot with the same crop using 
less water (van der Kooij et al. 2013). This thus ‘saves’ water, which the water 
user could potentially use elsewhere. The saved water can be used by the same 
owner to irrigate other crops with a higher water demand on the same field, or to 
irrigate new or expanded fields. Because of the profitability of drip irrigation on 
previously rain-fed fields, the owners of the drip irrigation projects in Khrichfa 
have all bought or hired more irrigation hours to serve their drip projects, thus 
putting higher pressure on the Seguia Khrichfa. Yet, the image that drip irrigation 
‘saves’ water is pertinent, and creates discussions amongst irrigators: if Khrichfa 
will get drip irrigation on a collective basis, where will the ‘saved’ water go? 
Some speculate about a re-allocation of water within the irrigation system (for 
example, saved water might be used to irrigate all the rain-fed land above the 
canal, or it could make the cultivation of fruit trees over the whole irrigation 
system possible). Others are more cautious and pessimistic, and wonder whether 
the ‘saved’ water will stay with the Khrichfa irrigators, or whether it will prompt 
a re-allocation at basin level. As the episodes of the T.O.R. gates and the tube-
well have shown, the introduction of the new technology may indeed generate 
unpredictable outcomes, re-patterning the water allocation of the Seguia Khrichfa, 
creating new contestations or injustices.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Our research was triggered by curiosity about the presence of modern drip irrigation 
technologies in a traditional farmer-managed surface irrigation system. In our 
attempt to understand this unusual blend of tradition and modernity, we engaged 
in a socio-technical historical analysis. We aimed at tracing and explaining how 
Seguia Khrichfa deals and has dealt with ever-changing distributional dilemmas 
and choices. Our analysis suggests that an important explanation for the durability 
of the Seguia Khrichfa lies in its adaptive capacity. The history of the irrigation 
system as told here is a story of how institutions are “patched and pieced together” 
(Cleaver 2012); a story of institutional bricolage, consisting of repeated ad-hoc 
adjustments that draw on existing and new forms of social organisation and 
material infrastructure. It is also a story of changing power relations, in which 
a heterogeneous and changing group of players continuously renegotiate their 
respective access to water, as part of and reflecting wider changes in social 
configurations of mutual dependency.
In spite of the increased competition over water, there are remarkably few 
instances of open struggle over how water is distributed in Khrichfa. Rather than 
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open or violent confrontations, tensions and conflicts are subtly dealt with through 
almost continuous revisions and re-negotiations about how water is distributed. 
The importance of negotiations perhaps explains why the most open struggle in 
the history of Khrichfa was about the right of sharecroppers to take part in them, 
through votes in WUA meetings. In Khrichfa both availabilities and demands 
for water are variable and ever-changing as a result of a complex combination of 
natural, technological and social factors. As a result, the nature of the distributional 
dilemmas and tensions to be solved also continuously changes. Our analysis 
shows how technology plays an important role in co-defining both the contents 
of the distributional questions as well as the types of possible solutions proposed. 
For instance, the orifices installed during the first rehabilitation project implied a 
specific way of arranging water distribution through calculated discharges. Many 
irrigators did not agree with the unverifiable water distribution of the orifices, and 
tinkered with the offtakes. Likewise, the installation of the T.O.R. gates set in motion 
a gradual shift in the locus of control from the canal operator to the WUA board. 
New technologies also evoked new ways of talking about water distribution; drip 
irrigation for instance comes with a discourse of efficiency, re-framing distribution 
as partly a question of the avoidance of losses and waste. The need to pipe the water 
for drip irrigation will also provoke another shift in possibilities for monitoring 
water flows, and is thus prompting new discussions about distributions of water and 
authority in the Seguia Khrichfa. Drip irrigation also (again) provokes discussions 
about whom to in- and exclude in the group of legitimate water users of Khrichfa, 
as drip irrigation makes it possible to irrigate new parcels of land.
Our analysis shows that technological re-configurations and translations may 
offer elegant and implicit ways of reconciling diverging and sometimes conflicting 
interests and goals, something that neatly suits the ‘agonistic cooperation’ 
character of Moroccan irrigation institutions noted by Geertz (1972). Rather than 
openly articulating and addressing tensions and conflicts in formal spaces for 
deliberation, proposing new technologies, or enrolling old technologies into new 
configurations, allows actors to enforce changes in the irrigation system and its 
management without harming the precarious balance of cooperation and without 
anyone losing face. In Khrichfa, technological transformations thus serve to 
conceal or resolve contentious negotiations, altering social relations and agency 
in non-conspicuous and implicit ways. This potential capacity of technologies for 
hiding politics, however, is not something that is intrinsic to the technology but the 
result of the specific socio-cultural relations in which the technology is embedded. 
In other contexts, rather than helping to hide and solve tensions, technologies may 
become the (symbolic) representation of differences of interests and conflicts. 
To draw attention to how institutions are often also technical, we have shown 
how technology mediates social relations in dynamic and interactive ways. 
A critical understanding of institutions, therefore, requires opening the black-
box of technologies. This goes beyond merely stating that the physical matters 
(Cleaver 2012), or acknowledging how technologies work. It instead entails 
acknowledging that technical modifications, innovations and tinkering form an 
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intrinsic part of processes of institutional bricolage. Institutions are continuously 
evolving socio-technical networks, in which all elements are relational and are 
thus subject to re-ordering. Here it is important to realize that what technologies 
do is not necessarily the intended effect of wilful human strategies, but may be an 
unanticipated effect that emerges once they are combined with other human and 
non-human elements in networks.
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